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BOOK REVIEW
SECURED TRANSACTIONS. By William B. Davenport and Damel R.
Murray PhiladelphIa, Pennsylvama: The Amencan Law Institute
1978.

Revtewed by Hon. Ellen A. Peters*
SECURED TRANSACTIONS by William B. Davenport and Damel
R. Murray IS one of a senes of texts published by the Amencan
Law Institute-Amencan Bar AssocIatIon Committee on Contmumg
ProfeSSIOnal EducatIon (ALI-ABA). ThIS text IS a reVlSlon of an
earlier work published m 1966 by Ray D Henson and the current
semor author ALI-ABA handbooks on the vanous artICles of the
Uniform CommercIal Code have been, as the foreword mdicates,
an Important part of ALI-ABA s educatIonal programs for the bar
Although published m paperback,l m what IS denommated a stu
dent editIon, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IS a book by practitIoners
for practitIoners. Like its predecessor, the text presents an orderly
overVIew rather than a critIcal analYSIS of the prOVlSlons of ArtICle 9
of the Uniform CommerCIal Code, the Secured TransactIons ArtI
cle. The authors have endeavored to illummate m 400 pages the
complexitIes mherent m the orgamzatIon and theoretIcal framework
of ArtICle 9 to enable practitIOners who are nOVIces with respect to
ArtIcle 9 to cope successfully with problems likely to be encoun
tered m the course of theIr practIce. 2 ThIS IS a tall order
It IS true that Karl Llewellyn S3 VISIOn for the Uniform Com
merCIal Code was the creatIon of a body of law that would be read
ily accessible to everyone engaged m commerce and a fortIon to
anyone tramed m the law Llewellyn felt, not without JustificatIon,
that commerCIal law had become artifiCIally complex because of ar
cane common law constructs such as title, whICh dommated the
law of sales, and overlappmg mconsistent statutes, such as those
ASSOCiate Justice, Connecticut Supreme Court; Professor (Adjunct), Yale Law
School.
1. SECURED TRANSACTIONS IS also available m hardbound edition.
2. Preface to W DAVENPORT & D. MURRAY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS at IX
(1978) [heremafter cited by sectIOn and page numbers only J.
3. Karl Llewellyn was the pnnclpal draftsman (and Chief Reporter) for the Um
fonn CommerCial Code.
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then regulatmg secured transactIons. 4 The goal of codificatIon al
ways has been to bnng order out of chaos by cuttmg away the un
derbrush of accumulated precedent. There IS no questIon that the
Uniform CommercIal Code has m fact enabled commercIal law to
take a quantum leap mto the 20th century to resolve more suc
cessfully and more expeditiously many of the problems that
plagued clients and practitIoners and courts ever smce the enact
ment of the last commercIal codificatIon at the turn of the cen
tury 5 We are vastly mdebted to the Amencan Law Institute and
the National Conference of CommIssIoners on Uniform State Laws
and all of the mdividuals who helped to draft the Uniform Com
merCIal Code. They produced an enormously .useful Code-but
not a mIracle. For it would have taken a mIracle sImultaneously to
modermze and to SImplifY the vast array of transactions governed
by the Uniform CommercIal Code. The legal philosophy underly
mg the Uniform CommercIal Code, that Identifiable fact patterns
would prOVIde a better gmde to the resolution of commercIal con
flicts than articulatIon of analytic pnnciples, IS clear enough, but le
gal realism ultImately proved madequate to the challenge. Over
the twenty years that the Code was drafted, it became necessary to
develop new constructs, 6 such as acceptance and "identification"
m Article 2, and "perfection and proceeds, and, more recently
"last event, m ArtIcle 9. As long as facts contmue to be suffi
CIently unruly not to fall meluctably mto one exclusIve pattern, the
resolution of disputes IS Immeasurably aIded by standards and
gmdelines and, mevitably legal pnnciples. Inescapably these legal
prmcIples can always be Improved by the applicatIon of the law
4. One of the more obscure of the pre-Code statutes governmg chattel security
arrangements was the Uniform Trust ReceIpts Act (1933), whIch Llewellyn hImself
had drafted.
5. The nucleus of the first Amencan codification of commercIal law was the
promulgation of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1896) and the Uniform
Sales Act (1906). Other statutes such as the Uniform Bills of Lading Act (1909) and
the Uniform Warehouse ReceIpts Act (1906) are essentially elaborations on and
amendments of particular proVISIOns of the Uniform Sales Act. Later enactments like
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (1918) and the Uniform Trust ReceIpts Act (1933)
were both narrower m scope and less WIdely accepted. Although many state legIsla
tures enacted vanety of commerCIal statutes to govern chattel mortgages, factor
liens, and accounts receIvable finanCIng, these statutes were neither uniform nor part
of general codification. For an account of the hIstory that led to the first codifica
tion, see G. GILMORE, THE ACES OF AMERICAN LAw 69-72 (1977) and G. Gilmore,
CommerCial Law In the United States: Its Codification and other Misadventures, In
ASPECTS OF COMMERCIAL LAw' SALES, CONSUMER CREDIT, AND SECURED TRANS
ACTIONS 449 0. Ziepel & W Foster eds. 1969).
6. G. GILMORE, supra note 5, at 85-86.
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yer s skill m discovenng refinements and distmctIons. In the end,
the law IS often better but it IS rarely simpler And so it IS with
the Code.
The authors effort to provIde a comprehensible overvIew of
ArtICle 9 starts with a sensible orgamzatIonal plan that deals sepa
rately with agreement, perfectIon, default, and pnoritIes. These
are certamly the cornerstones that are essentIal to an understand
mg of secured transactions. Withm each of these major subdivI
SIOns, the authors reVieW the text of the prOVISIons of ArtICle 9 m
its 1962 and its 1972 verSIOns, notmg differences where applicable
and reportmg many of the salient cases. The text IS emmently
readable, and, especIally m the chapter on pnoritIes, con tams
numbers of illummatmg hypothetIcal problems. As an exegesIs on
the prOVlSlons of ArtIcle 9 of the Code, taken section by section,
the text IS remarkably successful m provIding m one bnef volume a
great deal of useful mformatIon.
Invanably m a text of limited scope and SIze, the authors make
chOIces of emphaSIS and ellipsIs that should not be faulted although
they would not necessarily be shared by others workmg and teach
mg m the field. Nonetheless, withm the ambit of the task whICh
the authors have set for themselves, I found some omISSIOns per
plexmg. In the literature of secured transactIons and m the
caselaw 7 one recurrent Issue has been the extent to whICh the exe
cution of a financmg statement, 8 whose pnmary purpose IS to no
tifY thIrd persons of the eXIstence of a security mterest, can be
made to serve the reqUIrements of a written security agreement 9
whose pnmary purpose IS to serve as a statute of frauds between
the contractmg partIes. I was unable to find thIs question ad
dressed anywhere m the chapter on Security Agreements although
the chapter on PerfectIon, m its mtroductory sectIon 10 states, accu
rately enough, when a written security agreement IS reqUIred m a
secured transaction and none eXIsts, the filing of a financmg state
ment covenng the secured transactIon does not perfect the security
mterest until the prereqUIsite of the written security agreement,
also reqUIred for attachment, IS fulfilled. But surely thIs IS both
too little and too late. The Issue IS precIsely whether the prereqUI
site of the written security IS, with or without parol eVIdence, ful
See J.

& R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNI
788-91 (1972).
8. U.C.C. § 9-402 (1972).
9. Id. § 9-203(1).
10. § 4.01 at p. 116.

7.

WHITE

FORM COMMERCIAL CODE
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filled by the filing of the financmg statement. That Issue IS neither
clearly Identified not resolved; nor can a newcomer to ArtIcle 9
reasonably be expected to find the relevant references concernmg
security agreements m a chapter dealing with perfection.
A second fundamental Issue that has gIven nse to boundless
litIgatIon concerns the distmctIon between leases whICh are m
tended, or are found by courts to have been mtended, to be secu
rity mterests and leases whIch are pure" leases outSIde of the
regulatory scope of ArtICle 9. That Issue IS bnefly conSIdered m the
chapter concerned with the baSIC concepts and scope of ArtIcle 9. 11
I am skeptIcal whether so abbrevIated a discussIOn IS likely to serve
as an adequate mtroductIon to the complexitIes of cases such as In
re Leastng Consultants, Inc. 12 and Cittzens and Southern Eqmp
ment Leastng, Inc. v. Atlanta Federal Savtngs and Loan Assocw
twn. 13 Furthermore, the authors predictIon that a lease without an
optIon to purchase would be unlikely ever to be construed to cre
ate a security mterest has been recently proved erroneous by Bill
Swad Leastng Co. v. Stikes (In re Tillery).14 The line between
leases and security agreements IS sufficIently erratIc and opaque to
have warranted more extensIve treatment. 15
Two problems with the diSCUSSIOn of perfectIon illustrate re
lated concerns about the accuracy of the text at some Important
Junctures. It IS vital that a comprehensIve text be espeCIally ex
plicit about the Code s concept of, and directIves for, perfectIons.
PerfectIon IS after all the crucible by whICh security mterests are
tested. An unperfected security mterest does not survIVe the debt
or s bankruptcy and, hence, IS least efficaCIOUs when most needed.
The authors mtroductory definitIon of perfectIon as obtammg the
maxImum protectIon available for the partIcular type of collateral
"16 IS unfortunately both maccurate and mIsleading. It fails en
tIrely to correspond to the Code s definitIon,17 a reference not
without difficulty but nonetheless one that cannot readily be Ig
nored or subordinated to a footnote. 18 It fails to mform the reader
11. § 2.04(a) at pp. 27-28.
12. 486 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1973) (cited In § 4.07(a) at p. 210 n.338).
13. 144 Ga. App. 800, 243 S.E.2d 243 (1978).
14. 571 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir. 1978).
15. It would have been adVIsable to have noted In the diSCUSSIOn of exclUSIOns
(rather than, or perhaps In addition to § 2.04(c) at p. 30), the surpnsIngly successful
escape of the surety from Article 9. § 2.03(b) at p. 18.
16. § 4.01 at p. 115.
17 U.C.C. § 9-303 (1972).
18. § 4.01 n.7 at p. 116.
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of the fundamental distmctlOn between perfectIon and pnority that
IS one of the most Important orgamzmg pnncIples of ArtIcle 9. 19
ThIS distmctIon IS best exemplified by the Code s sectIons concern
mg purchase money security mterests m consumer goods. Without
the filing of a financmg statement, such security mterests are auto
matIcally perfected;20 but a financmg statement must be filed if the
secured creditor IS mterested m aVOIding subordinatIon to a subse
quent good faith consumer purchaser 21 I do not mean to suggest
that the authors fail to recogmze thIS distmctIon, but I cannot ac
cept theIr assertlOn 22 that theIr definitIon effectIvely expresses the
Idea that perfectIon confers pnority over some classes of competI
tors but not over others.
The authors, furthermore, are sometImes unclear about Imple
mentatIon of the rules for perfectIon. An mstance anses out of theIr
diSCUSSIOn of chattel paper Although confrontmg some of the diffi
cultIes that mhere both m the concept23 and m the operatIon24 of
security mterests m the form of chattel paper, the authors do not
suffiCIently warn of related pitfalls that may not be self-evIdent to
the ArtIcle 9 newcomer Chattel paper IS generated whenever writ
mgs evidence both a monetary obligatIon and a security mterest m,
or a lease of, specific goods. 25 A typICal example IS the executIon of
a security mterest, formerly known as a conditIonal sales con
tract, and a promISSOry note m conjunctIon with the purchase of an
automobile on tIme. The chattel paper may be discounted by as
SIgnment to a thIrd party and thIS refinancmg may m turn be per
fected either by filing or by takIng posseSSIon of the chattel paper
The authors adVIse, soundly that perfectIon by posseSSIOn IS ordi
narily preferable to perfectIon by filing, smce posseSSIon elimmates
the hazard of unauthonzed subsequent transfers of the chattel pa
per 26 They fail to warn, however, that perfectIon as to the chattel
paper, whatever its form, IS not necessarily effectIve as perfectIon
with regard to the security mterest m the underlymg chattel. 27 In
19. Compare U.C.c. §§ 9-301 to -306 with U.C.C. §§ 9-307 to -316.
V.C.C. § 9-302(l)(d) (1972).
21. Id. § 9-307(2).
22. § 4.01 at p. 115.
23. § 2.10(c) at pp. 71-75.
24. § 4.07(a) at pp. 209-12.
25. U.C.C. § 9-105(b) (1972).
26. § 4.07(a) at p. 211.
27. Negotiable documents of title, m contradistinction to chattel paper, do m
corporate nghts as to underlymg goods. Under the U.C.C., security mterests m goods
subject to document must be perfected by perfecting security mterest m the doc
20.
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the example above, delivery of the security agreement and the
note to the secured creditor perfects that creditor s nghts agamst
other takers from the aSSIgnor the automobile dealer but does not
obvIate the need to perfect a security mterest m the automobile
agaInst takers from the buyer Perhaps the dealer will already mde
pendently have perfected and then the secured creditor as asSIgnee
IS protected without reperfectIon. 28 Perhaps the distmctIon be
tween the two security mterests IS so transparently obvIOUS that no
reader could possibly be mIsled. My SUspICIon IS that dealers do
not always enter liens on certificates of title, and my expenence
with students has been one of consIderable confuSIOn about the du
ality of mterests mcorporated m chattel paper In any case, I would
have supposed that precautIons for the nOVIce practitIoner about
mqUIry mto nghts m the underlymg collateral would have been at
least as appropnate as precautIOns about chattel paper executed m
duplicate or tnplicate. 29
Other readers of SECURED TRANSACTIONS may find these
omISSIons less troublesome than I do. It IS arguable that occasIOnal
lapses, if such they are, are outweIghed by the excellence of the
presentatIon of such Issues as multIstate transactIons and pnoritIes.
On the latter subject, the authors effectIvely demonstrate the WIS
dom of theIr mtroductory observatIon that the rules for pnority are
best exammed m the context of concrete problems. 30 The complex
ity of theIr hypothetIcals does, however, belie theIr rather sangume
observatIon about the relatIve ease with whICh most problems of
pnority can be resolved. 31
My fundamental difficulty with thIS text, and more generally
with the genre of one-volume mtroductory texts, IS that I am less
ument. U.C.C. § 9-304(2} (1972). Davenport and Murray discuss the merger problem
with respect to leases In § 4.07(a}, but fail to address the more customary case of the
ordinary security Interest. Why the doctrine of merger has not been extended to chat
tel paper IS not clear. Possibly the reason IS based on the fact that chattel paper In
cludes monetary obligations that are not negotiable In form. Merger has historically
been an aspect of protection for holder In due course of negotiable paper. Possibly
the reason lies In commercial trade and usage. The kInds of goods that are apt to be
the subject of bailment are commerCially unlike the specific chattels that are apt to
become the underlYIng collateral for chattel paper. In these respects, chattel paper
may usefully be seen as halfway house between documents of title and accounts
receivable. Accounts also may arise out of the sale of goods, but the assignment of
accounts carries with it no expectations whatsoever about chattel security.
28. U.C.C. § 9-302(2} (1972).
29. § 4.07(a} at p. 211.
30. § 7.01 at p. 304.
31.

ld.
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sangume than are the authors about the nsks of oversimplification.
Even m law and especially m the law of secured transactions, a lit
tle knowledge can be a dangerous thmg. Nowhere does the present
volume more clearly illustrate the problem of oversimplification
than m the superficiality of its treatment of the relationship be
tween Article 9 and the federal law of bankruptcy The authors ac
knowledge, of course, that bankruptcy IS, m their words, "the aCid
test" for secured transactions. The authors, themselves seasoned
practitioners, clearly appreciate the senousness of this "aCid test."
But IS the novice practitioner bemg well served when he IS m
formed, essentially without qualification, that: (1) A secured party
need have no fear about the enforceability of a well-documented
security mterest m bankruptcy·32 (2) a secured party can rely on
the case law to have validated the Code s floating lien on mventory
and accounts vis-a-vIs the Bankruptcy Act;33 (3) a secured party
can, m bankruptcy aVOid vulnerability for filing a financmg state
ment withm 21 days, even though the Code allows only 10 days?34
The problems that bankruptcy poses for a secured lender are
Significantly exacerbated by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Re
form Act of 1978,35 effectIve October 1, 1979. The authors were
undoubtedly unfortunate to have come mto pnnt Just as thiS new
Act was bemg enacted. But its enactment had been presaged by
years of diSCUSSion m study commiSSIOns and m the Congress, and
the tendency of its reVlSlon to favor debtors and unsecured cred
itors was clearly foreseeable. In each of the mstances m which the
authors offer words of reassurance to the secured creditor, he IS
now m greater Jeopardy than he was before, and he was not free of
nsk even on September 30, 1979.
On the enforceability of security mterests m bankruptcy it IS
noteworthy that adequacy of documentatIon, while necessary IS
not mvanably suffiCient to assure happmess after bankruptcy
Bankruptcy means that secured collateral IS likely to be managed
through the admmlstratIve office of the bankruptcy court and can
not Simply be pnvately repossessed m the event of default. Under
the new Act, bankruptcy JunsdictIon attaches even to property m
the posseSSIOn of the secured creditor;36 it has always governed the

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

§ 6.11 at p. 301.
§ 3.07 at p. 108.
§ 4.03(c) at p. 161.
11 V.S.C.A. H 101-151326 (West Supp. 1979).
28 V.S.C.A. § 1471(e) (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (effective April I, 1984).
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much more frequent case of collateral III the possessIOn of the
debtor 37 Bankruptcy admlllIstratIon has been known to entail pro
longed and extensIve litIgatIon concermng even exqUIsitely docu
mented secured transactIons,38 and even Impeccable documenta
tIon has been known to be outweIghed III bankruptcy by the
debtor s need to use the secured collateral.39 Furthermore, no doc
umentatIon can alter the fact that the filing of a petitIon III bank
ruptcy serves automatIcally to exclude subsequently-acqUIred prop
erty from the ambit of the security lllterest.
The vIability of the floatlllg lien of a security lllterest III lllven
tory or m accounts, m the event of bankruptcy IS dramatIcally lim
ited by the preference sectIon of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. 40
DuBay v. Williams, 41 the case that has come to be seen as the
pnncIpal case upholding the floatmg lien, has not had a good press
either m bankruptcy cIrcles or among aficIOnados of the Code. 42
Its flat holding that any after-acqUIred property arrangement IS
totally validated by compliance with the Code s mstructIons for the
filing of a financmg statement mIght well have been limited, even
under the old Bankruptcy Act, to cases lllvolvmg the fact pattern
that DuBay itself illustrates. DuBay dealt with the easy case, the
substitutIon of essentIally fungible collateral of substantIally equal
value. The hard case IS the case III whIch the debtor s estate would
be dimImshed, on the eve of bankruptcy 43 by permittmg a for
merly undersecured creditor to mvoke hIS security mterest to Im
prove hIS positIon at the expense of the debtor s estate. None of
the reported cases has apparently had to face thIS Issue. Its out
come, hIghly doubtful under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, IS now
clear: the transactIon IS preferentIal44 and the secured creditor
37 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1976) (repealed 1979).
38. See, e.g., In re New Haven Clock & Watch Co., 253 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958).
39. See, e.g., In re Yale Express System, Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966).
40. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (West. Supp. 1979).
41. 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
42. The study committee for the bankruptcy reform commiSSIOn that was
charged with consldenng reVISIOn of federal bankruptcy law III light of the enact
ment of the U.C.C. was chaIred by Professor Grant Gilmore, prInCIpal draftsman of
Article 9. The Gilmore report critiCIzed DuBay and recommended reform sImilar In
pnnclple to the present § 547. 417 F.2d at 1277. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFER
ENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1970), reprinted In [1978] 6 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 6164.
43. Formerly four months under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C.
§ 96 (1976) (repealed 1979), now 90 days (or one year if an InsIder) under the Bank
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (West Supp. 1979).
44. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) & (e)(3) (West Supp. 1979).
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loses. No one should enter mto mventory or accounts receIvable
financmg without an understanding of thIs nsk, and without some
suggestion about practical means for mimmIzmg the nsk. An ap
propnate warnmg IS especIally Important here, because the Code s
abolitIon 45 of the rule of Benedict v Ratner46 can easily be
overread. Benedict reqUIred that a secured transaction be policed
as a conditIon of its mtnnsIC validity and that reqUIrement m those
terms IS no longer the law But regular monitonng of the state of
the secured collateral while it IS entrusted to the debtor may well
contmue to be sound commercIal advIce for other reasons, such as
aVOIdance of the law of preference.
The extent to whICh belated filing of a financmg statement can
be deemed timely for bankruptcy purposes, by reference to the
proVIsIons of sectIon 60 of the now-superseded Bankruptcy Act of
189847 IS a matter that IS today arguably only of histoncal mterest.
The Issue has not, to the best of my knowledge, surfaced m litIga
tion, and the learned commentators have always been m profound
disagreement. 48 Under these CIrcumstances, the assertIon that sec
tIon 60 will come to the rescue to validate a filing withm the
21-day penod followmg executIon of the secured transactIOn IS hard
to Justify Since October 1, 1979, reliance upon such adVIce would
be extraordinarily precanous. The new preference sectIon not only
elimmates any 21-day penod, but cuts back on the Code sown
provlSlon of shelter for belated filing, withm 10 days, of purchase
money security mterests. Under the Code, the lO-day penod be
gms to run from the date on whICh the debtor receIved posseSSIOn
of the secured collateral;49 under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, the
security mterest must be perfected "before 10 days after such secu
rity mterest attaches. "50 PartIcularly m purchase money transac
tIons, m whIch the collateral necessarily represents new value, it IS
45. U.C.C. § 9-205 (1972).
46. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
47. Section 60(a)(7)I.(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided that the time of
transfer (for the purposes of the law of preference) be determmed to allow twenty
one day penod for recording where applicable state law failed to proVide stated pe
nod withm whICh recordation had to be accomplished. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(7)I.(B)
(1976) (repealed 1979).
48. Compare lA P COOGAN, W HOGAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9.03(5)(c), at 994 (1965) with 2 G.
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.8, at 1325 (1965) and
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER
CIAL CODE 874 (1972).
49. U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1972).
50. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1979).
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likely that the security Interest will attach before the debtor re
ceIves posseSSIOn of the collateral. Far from extending the tIme to
perfect, the new Bankruptcy Act makes prompt filing more urgent.
A text entitled SECURED TRANSACTIONS that contams no sys
tematIc treatment of the relevant aspects of the law of bankruptcy51
and offers Instead pIecemeal advIce that IS more apt to mIslead
than to Inform will not, I believe, be a useful resource. No one has
the nght to expect answers to every hypothetIcal or to the first
case m litIgatIon. But, pressed for tIme, IS it not more appropnate
to cautIon rather than to Instill overconfidence, to provIde gmde
lines and to suggest general pnnciples, rather than to leapfrog,
through narrowly chosen examples, over the most difficult ques
tIons that the practitIoner and the student of secured transactIOns
must learn to resolve?
The matter of general pnncipies bnngs me to my final obser
vatIon about the orgamzatIon and the scope of the text under re
VIew When the Uniform CommercIal Code was first promulgated,
more than twenty-five years ago, it was the path of Wisdom to ap
proach it piecemeal, to try to asSImilate its prOVISIOns artICle by
artICle. I wonder whether that approach has not now been ex
hausted m the extenSIve literature that the Code has generated. To
purlom the related observatIon of ChIef JustIce Marshall In
M'Culioch v. Maryland,52 it IS a Code we are expounding. 53 Com
merCial transactIons routmely transcend the necessarily artifiCial
lines of the varIOUS Code ArtIcles. The Code s divlSlon mto ArtIcles
was not mtended to create a senes of Iron curtaInS but reflects
rather the histoncal aCCIdent of pre-eXIstIng laws separately ad
dreSSIng sales of goods, bills and notes, and chattel mortgages. It IS
not always easy to reconcile the commandments of the vanous ArtI
cles,54 espeCIally smce they exhibit conSIderable diversity In
draftmg style. Nonetheless, thIs IS the analytIc task that students of
the Code must confront In the 1980's. Only when we have

51. The text containS no separate chapter or subdiVISIOn devoted to problems
created by the law of bankruptcy Bankruptcy IS discussed Instead In §§ 3.07, 4.03(c),
and 6.11. Some specific hypotheticals are bnefly conSIdered In the pnorities chapter,
In §§ 7.03(j) and 7.03(j)(5).
52. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
53. See Judge Wisdom SImilar observation about the LoUISIana Civil Code.
Shelp
National Surety Corporation, 333 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1964) (Wisdom, J.).
54. As starter, the follOWing inconsIstencIes In U.C.C. sections may be noted:
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achIeved a firmer understanding of the fundamental pnnciples,
sometImes the competmg fundamental prmciples,55 that the Code
as a whole embodies, will we have a sure footmg for concrete ad
VIce about the problems that confront the practitIoner m hIs first
encounter with any aspect of the Uniform CommercIal Code.
55.

For

first mqUiry mto an exploration of some of these Issues, see Jackson

& Peters, Quest for Uncertamty: A Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inherent
Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the Uniform CommercIal Code, 87
YALE

L.J. 907 (1978).

